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OLIVIA SO COL, as Administratrix With the Will Annexed" 
etc., Appellant, v. LOU,IS KING, Respondent. ~< 
" 
[1] Appeal-Time to Appeal-Prescribed Period.-A 'lotice of, 
appeal from a judgillent was filed ·too late where it was filed: 
more than 120 days after date of entry of the judgment, and, 
the fact that appt'llunt's lIIotior. to vacate the judgment and. 
to enter a different judgmt:ut was not decided within 120 daye: 
after entry of the jlldgnlent did not mark the beginning of all" 
additional 30-day period within which she might file her DO.' 
lice, since rule 3(b) of thf' Hules 011 Appeal permits Dotice' 
to be tiled within 30 days after denial of the motion to vacate 
or 120 days after entry of judgment, whichever ahall be less. 
(2) ld.-Orders Appealable-Order on JdOtiOT. &or J)jjfereut Judg- ' 
ment.-An order of denial of a motion to vacate a judgment,j 
[1] See 2 Cal.:nr. 391; 3 Am.Jnr. 139. 
JdcK. Dig. References: [1] Appeal and Error, § 247~; [2] Ap-
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and enter a different one under Code Civ." Proc., 1663, is 
appealable as a apeeial order after final 'udgment under § 963, 
notwithstanding that the same ground! could be urged on an 
appeal from the judgment. 
[8] ld.-T'.me to Appeal-Appeal from Orclere.-A notbe of ap-
peal from an order denying a moti"u to vacate a judgment 
and enter a different one was timely and valiis where it was 
filed within 60 days after denial of tbe motion. 
('~ .Judgments -'- Opening and VacatiDg-Procedure.-There was 
a auffieient complianee with the provisions of Code Civ. Proe., 
I 663a, requiring notice of intention to mOle for aD order 
vaea~ a judgment to specify the time the motion would· be 
made, and rule 3(b) of Rules on Appeal, requi.riDg the motion 
to be made orany in vpen court within 60 days, ",here, in view 
of the fact that the trial judge was temporarily on duty in 
another county and it was not certain that he would be avail-
able to hear the motion, the parties, aubaequen'; tt the flling 
of the notiee of intention, stipulated that they would dispense 
with the oral presentation of the motion Idld would submit it 
to the trial judge on points and authorities, and where, more-
over, the motion was in fact submitted to the trial judge in the 
stipulated manner. 
APPEALS from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County and from an order denying motion to va~ 
the judgment. Ben V. Curler, Judge.- Appeal from judg. 
ment dismissed on motion. Motion to ditmli88 appeal from 
order denied. 
Porter O. Blackburn and Shelby Lee Chambers for Appel-
lant. 
Chas. T. Rippy for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Respondent moves to dimillll plaintiffs' 
appeals from a judgment of the superior court and from an 
order denying their motion to vacate the judgment and enter 
a new and different judgment under section 663 of the Code 
of Oivil Procedure . 
.A.ll of the following events took place in 1948. Judgment 
was entered in the trial court on April 28th. Notice of entry 
was filed by respondents on May 8th and by appellants on 
May 24th. On May 17th, appellants filed notice of intention 
) 
) 
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to move for an order vacating the judgment and entering a 
new and different judgment under subdivision 1 of section 
663 of the Code of Civil Procedure.· On September 13th, the 
trial court filed a written order denying the motion. Appel-
lants filed on September 24th, a notice of appeal from the 
judgment and on October 16th, a notice of appeal from the 
order denying the motion to vacate the judgment. Respond-
ent moves to dismiss the appeals on the grounds that (1) the 
appeal from the judgment was taken too late and (2) the 
order denying the motion to vacate under section 663 is not 
an appealable order. 
[1] 1. The appeal from the Judgment. Rule 3{b) of the 
Rules on Appeal provides: "When a motion to vacate a judg-
ment or to vacate a judgment and enter another and different 
judgment is made by any party on any ground within 60 days 
after entry of judgment, (1) if the motion is denied or not 
decided by the superior court within 120 days after the entry 
of the judgment, the time for filing the notice of appeal from 
the judgment is extended for all parties until 30 days after 
entry of the order denying the motion to vacate or 120 days 
after entry of the judgment, whichever shan be less." 
The 120th day after the entry of the judgment was August 
26th. Under rule 3(b) an appeal from the judgment had to 
be filed by that time, and the notice of appeal filed on Sep-
tember 24th was therefore too late. Appellants contend, 
however, that the purpose of rule 3{b) was not to establish 
an ultimate limit of 120 days from the entry of the judgment 
within which an appeal might be taken but to grant 30 days 
additional time from the denial of the motion however that 
denial might occur. It is urged that the rule be read as grant-
ing an extension of 30 days after denial of the motion "Of' 
ofter 120 days after entry of judgment. " The plain language 
of the rule does not admit of such construction. 
Rule 3(a), relating to extension of time to appeal from the 
judgment when there has been a motion for new trial, pro-
vides: "When a valid notice of intention to move for a new 
•• • A judgment or deeree, when baaed upon findings of faet made 
by the eourt . • • may, upon motion of the party aggrieved, be set 
aside and l"acated by the lIIlIle court and another and dilfcrent judg-
ment entered, for either of the following causes .•. 
"1. Incorreet or erroneous conclusions of law not ClOl1I!istent with 
or not supported by the findings of fact; and in lIuch euae when the 
judgment is set aside, the conclusions of law ahall be amended and 
correeted. " 
/ 
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trial is served and filed by any party within 60 days after 
entry of judgment, (1) if the motion is denied, the time for 
filing the notice of appeal from the judgment is extended for 
all parties until 30 days after denial of the motion by order 
of court or by operation of law." This rule accomplishes by 
its express terms the result that appellants would reach by 
their construction of rule 3 (b). It is reasonable to assume 
that had the Judicial Council intended to accomplish that 
result in section (b) of rule 3 it would have expressed that 
intention as it did in section (a). The failure to do so indi-
cates that this was not the intention of the council in adopting 
rule 3 (b) as written. 
It must be conceded that the operation of rule 3 (b) as it is 
presently written may constitute a pitfall for the unwary. 
Before the adoption of the rules, a motion to vacate the judg-
ment under section 663 did not extend the time for appeal 
from that judgment. Consequently, an appellant who wished 
to preserve his right of appeal when the trial court did not 
act on the motion had to invoke the slower and more costly 
method of appeal from the judgment, even though in doing 
so, he deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to act on the 
motion and to correct its own error. (Patch v. MiUer, 125 
Cal. 240 {57 P. 986] ; Parkside Realty Co. v. MacDonald, 167 
Cal. 342 [189 P. 805] ; Sacks v. Superior Court, 31 Cal.2d 
537 {190 P.2d 602] ; Modoc Cooperative Assn. v. Porter, 11 
Cal.App. 270 [104 P. 710] ; In re Shafter-Wasco Irrigation 
District, 55 Cal.App.2d 484 [130 P.2d 755J.} It was sought, 
in the adoption of rule 3, to eliminate the necessity for this 
costly double-barrelled attack upon the judgment. Insofar 
as motions for new trial are concerned, rule 3(a) accomplishes 
that result. Rule 3(b), however, does not. "[W]here the 
court fails to rule on the motion within 120 days after entry 
of the judgment: the time to appeal is extended to 120 days 
after entry of the judgment, the identical period. In other 
words, the extension expires as soon as it beg41s and counsel 
must therefore file notice of appeal before the end of the 120 
days if the court does not act." (Witkin, New RuZes on 
Appeal,17 So.Cal.L.Rev. 81, 98.) Although appellants choose 
initially to avail themselves of the more inexpensive and expe-
ditious method of asserting the defect, they must nevertheless 
file their notice of appeal within 120 days after entry of judg-
ment, if the court fails to rule on the motion before that time. 




296 SOCOL fl. KINg (840. 
experience the same difficulty.· Such amendment, hOwevtSr 
must come from the Judicial Council, and cannot be accom. 
plished by a strained construction of the plain language '-' 
the rule. ' ~. 
In Spotton v. Superior Covrl, 177 Oal. 719 [171 P. 801], 
decided before the adoption of the Rules on Appeal, the: 
court dismissed an appeal from the judgment taken more tbaD'\ 
60 days after entry thereof notwithstanding the pendp.]lcy o~ 
a motion under section 663, stating that the pendency of the 
motion did not extend the time for appeal. This 60-day limi~ 
was extended to 120 days by rule 3 (b), but the time to appeal 
from the judgment was not otherwise affected. Since appel:, 
!ants, notwithstanding their pending motion for vacation of: 
the judgment, failed to :file notice of appeal from the judgment· 
within this extended time, the appeal from the judgment mUlt , 
be dismissed. i 
[I] 2. TA, app6lJl from fM d,nial of fA, mofion. This 
operation of rule 3(b) does not, however, leave an appellant. 
who has failed to take a timely appeal from the judgment . 
completely remediless. Section 963 of the Code of Civil Pro- '. 
eedure provides, in part, that an independent appeal may be 
taken from ". . • any special order made after final judg-
ment . • ." Respondent contends that the order in question 
does not come within the section, but he cites no eases and 
we have found none that supports this contention. 
It will be noted that section 663a provides for an appeal > 
from an order granting such a motion, but is silent on the 
subject of an appeal from an order of denial. Accordingly, 
it might be contended that it was not intended to provide for 
an appeal in such case, under the general rule that there can 
be no appeal from an order of denial of a motion to vacate 
when the same grounds are available on an appeal from the 
judgment. It was so held in Modoc CooperatitJ, As",. v. 
Port,,,, 11 Cal.App. 270 [104 P. 710), a case strongly relied 
upon by respondent. The later decisions, however, have estab-
lished the rule that an order of denial of a motion to vacate 
under section 663 is appealable, notwithstanding that the 
same grounds could be urged on an appeal from the judg-
ment. (WinslO1O v. Harold a.Ferguson Corp., 25 Cal~ 
• Amending me 8 (b) to read: ". • • the time for filing the notice 
of appeal from the judgment is extended for all partiea until 80 dall 
after entry of the order denying the motion to vacate or 160 daya after 
entry of the judgment, whichever is leaa" would eliminate the diJlieul· 
tiea involved in the preaent rule and make the extension pattern COD' 
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274 [153 P.2d 714]; Funk v. Oampbell, 15 Cal.2d250 [100 
P.2d 762] ; Oalifornia Delta Farms, Inc. v. Ohinese-American 
Farms, Inc., 201 Cal. 201 [255 P. 1097); Bond v. United Bail-
roads, 159 Cal. 270 [113 P. 366, Ann.Cas. 1912C 50, 48 
L.R.A.N.S. 687]; Karlh v. Superior Oourt, 124 Cal.App. 373 
[12 P.2d 658]; W"tef'tlelt v. McCullough, 64 Cal.App. 362 
[221 P. 661] ; Potter v. Pigg, 35 Cal.App. 707 [170 P. 1066].) 
[3] The denial of the motion herein was on September 13th, 
and the notice of appeal, coming within 60 daya thereafter, 
was timely and valid. (See Bounds v. Dippolito, .,., p. 59 
[206 P.2d 1083].) . 
Eriat. of OOf'co'ftngas, 24 Cal.2d 517 [160 P.2d 194], and 
Estate of O'Dea, 15 Cal.2d 637 [104 P.2d 368], relied upon by 
respondent, do not support his contention. These eases were 
decided under Probate Code, section 1240, which enumerates 
. specifically what judgments and orders in probate matters 
are appealable. That section has no application to appeals 
from judgments or orders in ordinary civil proceedings, which 
are controlled by Code of Civil Procedure, section 963. 
The expiration of the 120-day limit terminated the exten-
sion of time within which an appeal could be taken from the 
judgment under rule 3(b). It did not purport to deet the 
power of the trial court to rule on the motion to vacate the 
judgment, and the statutes prescribe no time limit within 
which the power must be exercised. The formal order of 
September 13th· denying the motion was, therefore, an order 
of denial appealable as a special order after final judgment 
under section 963. 
[41 Finally, respondent urges that even though the order 
is otherwise appealable, the appeal should be dismissed because 
appellants failed to comply with section 663a in that their 
notice of intention to move for an order vacating the judg-
ment did not specify the time the motion would be made, 
and because the motion was not made Qrally in open court 
within 60 daya, under rule 8 (b). Appellants' reply brief 
clearly discloses the reasons for failure to comply. It appears 
that the trial judge was temporarily on duty in Los Angeles 
County, from his home county of Lassen to which he returned 
periodically, and it was not certain that he would be available 
to hear the motion.. Accordingly, subsequent to the filing of 
the notice of intention, all parties stipulated that they would 
dispense with the oral presentation of the motion, and would 
submit it to the trial judge on points and authorities. In view 
of this stipulation, and the fact that the motion was in fact 
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submitted to the trial judge in the stipulated manner wi .i 
60 days, it must be held that there has been substantial com.; 
pliance with these requirements. (Estate of Grivil, 208 cat 
77,81 [280 P. 122].) .• \, 
The appeal from the judgment is dismissed. The motion _ 
dismiss the appeal from the order denying the motion to ~ 
cate the judgment is denied. ' 
Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J., and Spence, J., eoncurred. 
CARTER, J .-1 dissent. 
The only rational and fair interpretation of rule 3 (b) , 
the Rules on Appeal is that where the denial of a motion .. 
vacate a judgment is not made within 120 days after the en " 
of judgment, then the time to appeal is extended for 30 d~' 
after the 120 days, making a total of 150 days. .;~ 
The rule is fairly and reasonably susceptible of that eOn-; 
struction. The whole purpose of it is to provide anextenrioft 
of time to appeal where a motion to vacate a judgment is made: 
No extension is achieved if the time within which the motion 
may be passed upon and for taking an appeal expire simul-\ 
taneously. If the motion is denied or not decided within 120, 
days, the time for filing notice of appeal is extended until 
" 30 days afte,. entry of the order denying the motion . . . or' 
120 days after entry of the judgment." Grammatically, the 
clause "80 days after" modifies and is applicable to bo'h i 
situations, a denial of the motion by the court and a failure. 
to act within 120-days. , ~: 
That such construction should be placed upon the rule is' 
clear to me. It is conceded by the majority that to construe; 
it otherwise "constitutes a pitfall for the unwary." No rule' 
or law should be given an interpretation having that result. ,,~ 
The injustice which may result from such an interpretation" 
is further emphasized when we realize that it means that if the ~ 
court has not ruled on the 120th day, the notice of appeal,~ 
must be filed on the same day or the right to appeal is lost. "i' 
But it would not be possible to file a notice of appeal on that :,' 
day inasmuch as the day would have to end before it was ; 
known whether a ruling would be made, and then it would be <" 
too late to appeal. Suppose counsel does not have his office . 
in the county seat. It may wen be physically impossible for, 
him to get his notice of appeal filed in time,even if he was 
notified during the 120th dav that his motion to vacate had 
been denied. 
Sept. 1949] SoCOL tI. KING 
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The majority argue that since the rule 88 to extension of 
time by new trial proceedings by "express terms" provides 
for a maximum of 150 days within which an appeal may be 
taken, and the rule on vacation of judgment proceedings con-
tains no such express provision, it cannot be so construed. 
This argument is squarely refuted by the following comments 
of one of the draftsmen of the rules: "Under our former 
statute, only new trial proceedings served to extend time to 
appeal. In view of the general policy favoring applications 
for relief in the trial court, the draftsman suggested that 
motions made "nder 8ectitm 669 of the Code of Citlil Proce-
dure, which are analogous and complemenf6ry fo flew trial 
motions, shouZd likewise receive the benefits of the e~fen.riofl 
provision. One objection, of course, W88 that the statute fixes 
a time limit for deciding motions for new trial, but no such 
limit is placed upon the other type of motion. Accordingly 
the rule, 88 drafted, specifies a maximum period of 120 days 
after entry of the judgment, in which the motion to vacate 
must be made and decided, if the proceeding is to operate 88 
an extension of time to appeal. This period cOf'f'esponds to 
tke tntUimum possible "Mer fhe flew trial statute." (17 So. 
Cal.L.Rev. 96.) The maximum time for appealing where 
there are new trial proceedings is 150 Mys. (MeUin v. Tr01U-
dell, 33 Ca1.2d 858 [205 P.2d 1036].) To carry out the pur-
pose, that is, to give tke same extension where there is a motion 
to vacate a judgment, compels the conclusion that the maximum 
should be 150 MY'. Correctly construed, therefore, the rule 
provides for a period of 30 days after the 120 days which 
would make a total of 150 days within which an appeal may 
be taken after the entry of judgment where a motion is made 
pursuant to the provisions of section 663 and denied on or 
after the 120th day. 
The interpretation placed by the majority upon rule 3 (b) 
postulates an unjust reflection upon the able and eminent 
jurists who constitute the Judicial Council of California and 
the learned and able draftsman of said rule. 
I would deny the motion to dismiss the appeal from the 
judgment. 
Schauer, J., concurred. 
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied October 
13,1949. 
-
